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MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND DEBT IN SMALL INDUSTRIALISED 








This paper considers the impact of military spending on debt in a panel of 11 small 
industrialising economies using panel data methods. It provides estimates for fixed 
effects and random effects models and then moves on to consider dynamic models. The 
dynamics are found to be important and the results suggest that military burden does 
indeed have a positive impact on the share of external debt in GDP. 
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Evaluating the economic effects of military spending continues to be an important and 
productive area of research. While researchers have recognised and studied many 
possible channels by which military spending can influence the economy, one channel 
that has had little attention has been the impact of military spending on the indebtedness 
of an economy, the most important component of which will be external debt. This can 
be a particularly important problem for developing countries with relatively weak 
economies. Unlike other effects of military expenditure, that tend to be through the 
crowding out of technical resources and so have a greater impact the more capital 
intensive military expenditure is, the creation of external debt can be a problem even for 
countries where military spending is relatively labour intensive. Brzoska (1983) made 
one of the first attempts to identify the importance of military spending for developing 
country debt, finding that for many indebted developing countries it was a major 
component of government spending. A limited literature including Looney (1987, 1989, 
1998) has attempted to investigate this potential effect, focussing on how military 
expenditures can affect the external debt of developing countries. 
 
This paper makes a further contribution to the literature. It considers the impact of 
military spending on debt in a panel of small industrialising economies using panel data 
methods. The next section discusses public deficits and development, followed by a 
discussion of the relation between military spending and debt. The data and sample to be 
used in this study are then outlined and the available estimation methods discussed. The 
next section presents some results using panel data models on the sample of countries 
and, finally, some conclusions are presented. 
 
DEBT, DEFICITS AND DEVELOPMENT  
 
Debt and deficits are important issues in developing and industrializing economies. When 
a government cannot cover its expenditures by its revenues it has four ways to finance the   4
resulting deficit: printing money, using foreign exchange reserves, borrowing abroad and 
borrowing domestically. Although interrelated, it is possible to identify different 
macroeconomic balances with different methods of deficit financing: printing money and 
inflation; foreign reserve use with the onset of exchange crises; foreign borrowing with 
external debt crisis; and domestic borrowing with higher interest rates (and possibly, 
explosive debt dynamics as borrowing leads to higher interest rates charges on the debt 
and a larger deficit) (Fischer and Easterly, 1990).  
 
High public sector deficits relative to GDP potentially create a need for foreign 
borrowing and external debt accumulation, particularly when the means to finance 
deficits domestically is limited. Hence, there is likely to be a relatively close relation 
between the deficits and foreign borrowing in developing countries, where the potential 
to use tax revenues to finance public expenditures is limited, where the creation of money 
has already been (mis)used considerably, where financial markets are relatively thin and 
domestic borrowing possibilities are relatively limited. As Fry (1997) observes, the 
typical OECD country finances about 50 percent of its deficit from voluntarily domestic 
sources, while the same ratio for a typical developing country is only about 8 percent. 
 
On the other hand, the dangers of excessive reliance on external borrowing to finance 
budget deficits (and of large budget deficits per se), are illustrated by the experience of 
debt crises (Fischer and Easterly, 1990). In the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the late 
1990s, most of the countries that witnessed debt-servicing difficulties were running huge 
public deficits. This led to a foreign debt crisis generally being seen as the mirror image 
of a fiscal crisis, as most of the external borrowing is usually undertaken by governments 
(Sachs and Larrain, 1993). 
 
The impact of excessive foreign debt accumulation on developing economies has been 
investigated in the literature (see for example Doroodian, 1985; Brooks et al, 1998; 
Milman, 1998; Patillo et al, 2002). Some internal and external factors that are identified 
in effecting growth are a deterioration in terms of trade, a slow-down of economic 
activity in the industrialised countries, initially a sharp increase in the availability of   5
foreign sources, poor domestic economic policies, an overvaluation of domestic currency, 
and debt mismanagement. One of the most important issues is the debt-growth 
relationship. The typical foreign debt crisis is seen to be accompanied by slower or even 
negative economic growth and accelerating inflation (Fry, 1997).  
 
This is not to suggest that foreign borrowing inevitably damages growth. Countries with 
limited stocks of capital at the early stages of development are also likely to provide 
investment opportunities, with rates of return higher than those in advanced economies 
(Pattillo et al, 2002). Reasonable levels of borrowing by such countries are likely to 
enhance their economic growth through productive investments, which will in turn allow 
for timely debt repayments. However, ‘debt overhang’ theories suggest that large 
accumulated debt stocks may become an obstacle to growth, as they can discourage 
further domestic and foreign investment. Pattillo et al. (2002) use the debt ‘Laffer curve’ 
to illustrate those positive and negative impacts of debt. They suggest that on the upward-
sloping or ‘good’ section of the curve, increases in the face value of debt are associated 
with increases in expected debt repayment, while increases in debt reduce expected debt 
repayment on the downward-sloping or ‘bad’ section of the curve. They also considered 
the crowding-out effects that may arise from resources being spent on debt servicing 
instead of investment or other growth enhancing domestic spending. In addition, when 
debt accumulation follows a Ponzi scheme, where failing to pay off debt leads to the need 
for extra borrowing and increasing interest payments, then the total amount of debt can 
spiral out of control. 
 
Clearly in evaluating the impact of debt on growth, it is important to consider how the 
external debt is used, in particular whether it used to increase productive capacity. 
Research has, however, suggested that a high percentage of the money borrowed abroad 
is not used productively (Dornbusch, 1987). One obvious and potentially important 
unproductive use is military expenditure, to which we now turn. 
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MILITARY SPENDING AND DEBT 
 
While there is an extensive literature on the economic effects of military expenditure on 
developed and developing economies, there is little in the way of consensus. The 
different theoretical perspectives that underpin the empirical work disagree in the manner 
in which the economy is affected by growth in military spending and in their 
interpretation of the results. One can argue that the overall results tend to show an 
insignificant or negative impact of military spending on economic growth in developing 
countries and a clearer negative impact in developed economies, through military 
spending being at the expense of investment rather than consumption. This does, 
however, hide a diversity of literature and results. Many of the earlier cross-section 
analyses have found sample selection to be important and this led to calls for more case 
studies. Time series analyses of individual economies and groups of economies have 
improved understanding, but also produced a variety of results (Dunne, 1996). This 
suggests that working between these extremes, using cross-country studies of groups of 
similar economies with relatively long time series may be of value. This paper takes this 
approach, focusing upon a sample of small industrialising economies.  
 
Some authors, starting with Brzoska (1983), have pointed to military expenditure as 
being an important variable in explaining the rise of foreign debt in a number of 
developing countries, suggesting that this has led to reduced economic growth. The 
relationship between military expenditures and external debt can be of two forms. First, 
as a budget item, military expenditure creates the need for funding. If, as discussed 
above, the domestic sources are not enough, one alternative is to borrow externally. More 
directly, a component of military spending will be allocated to pay for arms imports, 
which will create a need for foreign exchange. If the economy lacks foreign exchange, it 
will need to obtain it from external sources, mainly by borrowing. It is also possible that 
depreciations in currency can lead to increases in foreign exchange requirements over the 
life of a project (as happened in the recent South African arms deal discussed in Dunne 
(2003))   7
 
Following Brzoska (1983), Looney and Frederiksen (1986) suggest that high external 
borrowing due to defence will only have a negative effect on a country’s overall growth 
performance if it faces constraints on international borrowing. As Looney (1989) argues, 
weapons purchased with scarce foreign exchange reduce the resources available for the 
import of intermediate and investment goods essential for self-sustaining growth. In their 
empirical analysis Looney and Frederiksen (1986) categorise developing countries as 
resource constrained and unconstrained, using discriminant and factor analysis, 
suggesting that the unconstrained group are able to support higher level of arms imports. 
Looney (1989) investigated how military expenditures and arms imports affect debt, 
using models for the determinants of military expenditure, public external debt, and arms 
imports and running Two Stage Least Squares regressions for the whole sample, 
resource-constrained countries and unconstrained countries. He found arms imports to be 
a significant contributory factor to Third World indebtedness. More recently, Senesen 
and Sezgin (2002) considered the relation between debt and military expenditure in 
Turkey. They found that although the growth in military spending did not seem to have a 
positive effect on external debt, the growth of arms imports did.  
 
 
SAMPLE AND DATA 
For this study, data on small industrialising economies for the period 1960-2000 were 
taken from the World Bank Economic Indicators CD ROM, with the corresponding 
military burden and arms import data taken from SIPRI. The size of the sample was 
restricted to 11 countries by the lack of data for external debt. In addition, data were not 
available for the whole period for all of the countries, giving us an unbalanced panel. 
Table 1 gives information on the population, GNP per capita, the rank, and the military 
burden of each country. 
 
<Table 1 here> 
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ESTIMATION METHODS 
 
One major problem in the estimation of any relation between military spending and 
growth is the lack of variation in the military spending data relative to other economic 
indicators. The end of the Cold War has improved things as it has given us some years of 
marked changes in military spending around the world, adding to the variance of the data 
and making the identification of any relation with other economic aggregates easier. One 
way of overcoming this lack of independent exogenous variation in the data has been by 
pooling cross section and time series data for a relatively homogenous group of countries 
(Murdoch et al, 1997). There is a potential problem that the cross section and time series 
parameter may be measuring different thing, the former the long run and the latter the 
short run effects, which would mean that the pooled relation is then a weighted average 
of the two. Panel data methods provide a variety of approaches to attempt to deal with 
some of these issues, with pooling the simplest form and fixed effect and random 
coefficient estimators providing more flexible approaches.  
 
Considering a dependent variable y and an independent variable x with subscripts 
representing a country j and a year t. The pooled OLS model estimates will be: 
yjt = ?  + ? xjt + ujt                 (1) 
and assumes all parameters are the same for each country. The fixed effects estimator 
allows the intercept to differ across countries 
yjt = ? j + ? xjt + ujt                 (2) 
which ignores all information in the cross sectional relation. Time fixed effects can also 
be allowed for separately or together in a two way fixed effect model: 
   yjt = ? t + ? j + ? xjt + ujt              (3) 
With the relatively long time series available it has become possible to introduce 
dynamics to the panel data models.  In dynamic models of the form: 
  yjt = ? j + ? xjt + ? yjt-1 + ujt              (4) 
the fixed effect estimator is not consistent as N, the number of groups, goes to infinity for 
fixed T because of lagged dependent variable bias, which biases ?  downwards. It is, 
however, consistent as T goes to infinity. For samples where T is large, as it is the bias is   9
small, but if the parameters differ over the groups then there is a further heterogeneity 
bias. When T is large this bias can be avoided by estimating each equation individually 
and then taking the weighted or unweighted average of the individual estimates. A 
common weighted average is the random coefficient model (RCM), discussed in Pesaran 
and Smith (1995).  
 
An alternative approach to dealing with the dynamics is to use the method developed in 
the context of samples with small numbers of time series observations. This takes the 
estimation equation and differences it to transform out the country specific effects and 
then allows a dynamic specification in differences, with a lagged dependent variable. As 
the differencing induces a bias in the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, 
because of the correlation between it and the unobserved fixed effects in the residual, an 
instrumental variable method must be adopted. The Arellano and Bond (1991)  
generalised method of moments (GMM) technique uses lags of the endogenous variables 
for the years t-2 and earlier as instruments. These give unbiased and consistent estimates 
of the coefficients. This requires that the differenced equation does not exhibit second 
and higher order autocorrelation. 
 
In this study we do have a reasonable number of observations but the unbalanced nature 
of the panel prevents us from using the random coefficient model. So the approach taken 
is to initially estimate a static fixed effects model, move to introduce a lagged dependent 





There is little guidance in the literature as to how one might model the determination of 
external debt. Using Looney (1989) and Senesen and Sezgin (2002) as pointers, we take a 
simple model in which the share of external debt is a function of military burden (MB) 
economic growth and the share of exports in GDP and this gives the results in Table 2.  
   10
<Table 2 here> 
 
The variables are:  
ETDBS =   External debt as a share of GDP 
GY95=   growth of GDP constant US $ 1995 
MB=    Military burden: milex as a share of GDP 
RESDS=   Net international reserves as a share of GDP 
FINAS=   Financing from abroad as a share of GDP 
ITE=    Interest payments as a % of GDP 
GDY=   Central government as a % of GDP 
TAXS=  Tax revenue as a share of GDP 
TDSY=  Total debt service as a % GNI 
TDSDS=  Total debt service as a share of GDP 
AIS=    Arms imports (1990) prices as a share of GDP (1995 prices 
XDS=    Total exports of goods and services as a share of GDP 
 
The dependent variable is external debt as a share of GDP. Clearly this will include both 
public and private debts, but in small industrializing economies it seems reasonable to 
assume that debt related to the import of arms and arms components will be very 
important. Alami (2002) shows this for the Arab countries in a recent contribution. The 
dependent variables include economic growth and exports to account for the fact that 
faster growing and exporting countries are more likely to need to spend by borrowing 
abroad, but if they do need to borrow are more likely to be able to repay. They are likely 
to be considered a good risk. We would expect growth to have a positive effect on 
external debt, but exports are a bit more difficult to call. We might expect a negative sign, 
but it is also possible that increases in exports lead to increased imports of capital and so 
lead to the positive effect we observe in the static model. Interestingly, when we 
introduce a lagged dependent variable the coefficient on exports becomes insignificant.  
 
There is a wider issue of the stage of development of the economies as, although the 
share of military expenditures does not necessarily depend on the level of development of 
the countries, the more developed the economy the easier it is likely to be to fund 
spending. For example, international reserves can be important for arms imports and the 
less developed the economy the more likely that it will have to use foreign borrowing. 
Using panel data methods should allow such factors to be picked up as fixed effects.    11
 
The results suggest that military burden has a positive effect on the share of debt in GDP 
when we allow for dynamic effects within the model. The other variables are much as 
one would expect. The random effects model  results are presented in Table 3 give 
similar results. 
 
<Table 3 here> 
  
Overall, these results suggest that when time series and cross section data are brought 
together and country specific effect are allowed for, as well as dynamics (in a very simple 
way) that military spending has a positive impact on the share of debt, as does the level of 
reserves and exports. Growth as expected has a negative impact. 
 
The Arellano-Bond GMM estimates from the routine in Stata 7 are presented in Table 4.  
 
<Table 4 here> 
 
This method uses a two stage procedure, the first stage for inference on the coefficients, 
the z statistics and the second for inference on the model specification, namely the Sargan 
test on instruments and first and second order autocorrelation tests. The second step 
estimates of the coefficient standard error tend to be biased in relatively small samples. 
The results are generally consistent with the other dynamic results, providing further 





This paper has provided a contribution to the debate on the economic effects of military 
spending on debt, focusing upon a sample of small industrialising economies and using 
panel data techniques. The large changes in military spending in the post Cold War 
period have increased the variation in the data making it more likely that empirical 
analyses would be able to distinguish any underlying macroeconomic relationship from 
noise. Combining this with panel data methods gives us the best chance of identifying   12
any empirical relation between military burden and debt. Static and dynamic fixed effects 
and random effects models were estimated. The dynamics were found to be important 
and gave the result that military burden does indeed have a positive impact on the share 
of external debt in GDP. Using a more satisfactory approach to dynamic panel data 
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Table 1: Sample Characteristics 1998 
     
            GNP 
        Population  per capita    Defence   
Country      Millions   $1998  Rank    %GNP 1997 
Chile         14.8      4990  66    3.9     
Brazil        165.9      4630  68    1.8 
Argentina       36.1      8030  55    1.2 
Venezuela       23.2      3530  81    2.2 
South Africa       41.4      3310  83    1.8 
Malaysia       22.2      3670  78    2.2 
Philippines       75.2      1050  132    1.5 
India        979.7        440  161    2.8 
Pakistan       131.6        470  158    5.7 
S. Korea        46.4      8600  51    3.4 
Turkey        63.0      3160  85    3.3 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2000 
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Table 2: Fixed Effects Estimation Results 
 
Dependent variable is EDBTDS 
 
  Coeff  T ratio  Coeff  T ratio  Coeff  T 
ratio 
Coeff  T 
ratio 
                 
MB  0.011  1.5  0.017  4.4  0.012  1.6  0.018  5.2 
RESDS  -0.948  -3.8  0.106  0.8  0.466  2.2  0.234  2.6 
GY95  -0.680  -3.3  -0.808  -7.8  -1.012  -4.6  -0.786  -8.3 
XDS  0.721  5.8  0.071  1.1         
EDBTDS1      0.829  28.3      0.861  36.2 
CONST  0.305  6.6  0.028  1.1  0.354  9.5  0.018  1.0 
                 
N  280    276    317    306   
Countries  11    11    11    11   
Min obs  7    6    7    6   
Max obs  31    30    31    30   
Av obs  25.5    25.1    28.8    27.8   
Rsq within  0.17    0.80    0.08    0.83   
Rsq   0.08    0.87    0.12    0.88   
 
. 
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Table 3: Random Effects GLS regression Results 
 
Dependent variable is EDBTDS 
 
  Coeff  T ratio  Coeff  T ratio  Coeff  T 
ratio 
Coeff  T 
ratio 
                 
MB  0.014  1.9  0.010  5.0  0.011  1.5  0.011  4.8 
RESDS  0.50  2.6  0.142  2.6  -0.870  -3.5  0.129  1.4 
GY95  -1.02  -4.7  -0.800  -8.9  -0.710  -3.4  -0.878  -9.0 
XDS          0.670  5.7  0.012  0.3 
EDBTDS1      0.889  44.8      0.888  41.6 
CONST  0.34  6.53  0.040  3.4  0.299  4.8  0.040  3.1 
                 
N  317    306    280    276   
Countries  11    11    11    11   
Min obs  7    6    7    6   
Max obs  31    30    31    30   
Av obs  28.8    27.8    25.5    25.1   
Rsq within  0.08    0.83    0.17    0.79   
Rsq   0.12    0.88    0.08    0.88   
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Table 4: Dynamic Panel GMM Estimates 
 
Dependent variable is first difference of EDBTDS 





EDBTDS: LD  0.734  26.1  0.0 
MB: D1  0.019  4.6  0.0 
RESDS: D1  -0.016  0.5  0.6 
GY95: D1  -0.070  -7.9  0.0 
XDS: D1  -0.133  1.1  0.3 
CONST  0.004  1.0  0.3 
       
N  265     
Countries  11     
Min obs  5     
Max obs  29     
Av obs  25.1     
Sargan step2  7.13  P=1   
AR(1)  -1.45  P=0.95   
AR(2)  0.09  P=0.93   
 
 